The Overturn of Chevron: Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo

At the end of June, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned a case that had been a titan of administrative law for four decades. In 1984, Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council established a two-step test for ruling on the legality of government agencies’ interpretations of vague statutory language.¹ Under Chevron, if Congress had spoken to the issue directly, its intent would be enacted. If a judge found Congress had not spoken on an issue or if the statutory direction was ambiguous, the Court would next determine whether the agency’s interpretation was reasonable. If the interpretation was reasonable, the judge would defer to the agency. Over the years, this test was used in more than 18,000 federal court decisions.²

In 2024, the Court heard Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, which concerned the National Marine Fisheries Service’s (NMFS) interpretation of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act.³ In the face of an ambiguous statute, NMFS had decided that it had the authority to make certain Atlantic herring fishermen cover the costs of third-party observers on their vessels for conservation purposes, an interpretation which NMFS claimed was due deference under Chevron. While the Court declined to consider the specific issue of NMFS’ interpretation, they did agree to rule on the continuing validity of Chevron.

The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice John Roberts and joined by five other justices, declared the Chevron test invalid, citing a conflict with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The majority criticized Chevron for taking the power of statutory interpretation away from courts, arguing that judges are not allowed to simply approve a reasonable interpretation, but instead are mandated to find the “single, best meaning” of a statute’s text.⁴

The majority also brushed aside concerns that its decision went against stare decisis, a legal principle which encourages judges to stand by the decisions of prior courts without an especially strong reason not to. The majority said that Chevron was so flawed that it warranted ignoring stare decisis, especially given that the Supreme Court itself had not used the test since 2016.

In her dissent, Justice Elena Kagan opposed the majority’s decision on multiple grounds. Kagan argued that given that statutory ambiguities are inevitable, it is vastly preferable to have legislative gaps filled in by agencies rather than by courts who, unlike the former group, are politically unaccountable and lack subject matter expertise. She went on to criticize the majority for, in her view, needlessly seizing power for the judiciary, and turning the Supreme Court into “the country’s administrative czar.”⁵ The dissent also denounced the majority’s refusal to respect stare decisis, pointing out that the Supreme Court’s recent repudiation of the Chevron test stemmed not from the doctrine’s failings, but from a deliberate strategy allowing the majority to later strike it down.

With Chevron overturned, the fate of agency regulation is uncertain. Though the majority made assurances that prior decisions using the Chevron test would remain untouched, the dissent raised concerns about the ease with which the majority had struck down major precedent, worrying that future courts might just as easily set aside other Chevron-based decisions. Which of these viewpoints is more accurate will be seen in the coming years as the legal community reacts to what will likely be a sea change in administrative law.

¹ Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
² Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron and Stare Decisis, 31 Geo. Mason L. Rev . 475, 477 (2024).
³ Loper Bright Enters., Inc. v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024).
⁴ Loper, 144 S.Ct. at 2266.
⁵ Id. at 2295.