Limited-Entry Statutory Scheme Is Constitutional

SandBar Printer-Friendly Article
SandBar 7:2, July, 2008 Limited-Entry Statutory Scheme Is Constitutional Riley v. Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management, 941 A.2d 198 (R.I. 2008). Terra Bowling, J.D. In a constitutional challenge to Rhode Island’s limited-entry fishing licensing scheme, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has held that statutory limits on entry into the state’s fishery do not the violate the right to pursue a lawful occupation or the right to a free fishery. Background When Steven Riley applied to the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management (DEM) for a principal effort fishing license, the department denied his application, citing the fact that Riley did not have a prior license. Rhode Island’s Commercial Fishing Licenses Act of 2000 allows only those holding a valid principal-effort or multipurpose license before December 31, 2002 to receive a “new” principal-effort license.1 Although the Department denied Riley’s application for the principal effort license, it approved Riley for another, less lucrative, entry-level commercial fishing license. Despite this, Riley filed suit, claiming that his constitutional rights were violated because the entry-level license did not give him the same rights to fish for the same species as other commercial fishermen. The lower court granted summary judgment in favor of the DEM. Right to Pursue a Lawful Occupation On appeal, the court first addressed Riley’s claim that the denial of the preferred license violated the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by denying his fundamental right to pursue a common occupation of life. The court looked at whether a fundamental right was, in fact, involved. The court recognized that the “liberty” provision in the due process clause includes “the right of the individual to engage in the common occupations of life . . .”2 However, in this instance, the court found that the statute did not restrict Riley’s right to pursue the occupation of commercial fisherman, given that he was granted a commercial fishing license. The fact that the license was less lucrative than the one he sought did not matter. The license he was approved for enabled him to harvest more than a hundred species of fish and other sea creatures. Because no fundamental right was involved, Riley had to prove that there was a violation of substantive due process, which requires a plaintiff to prove that the law is “clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.”3 Riley was unable to prove that the law was arbitrary and unreasonable. The court noted that limiting the fishery to those who possessed a license prior to 2002 “has a real and substantial relationship to a legitimate governmental goal of limiting the number of licenses available to take restricted species.”4 Right of Fishery Next, the court examined whether a fundamental constitutional right of fishery was implicated in the case. The court noted that the Rhode Island constitution guaranteed the “rights of fishery” to the people of the state.5 Furthermore, the state courts have consistently held “that the right of fishery in Rhode Island belongs to the general public, and to no particular individual.”6 However, the court did examine whether the General Assembly acted within its power granted to it by the state constitution in regulating the fishery. Riley argued that because the statute only allowed some commercial fishermen to take restricted species, it denied other citizens equal access to the fishery in violation of their constitutional rights. Essentially, Riley thought that the right of equal access required that “either everyone is permitted to harvest the same species, or no one is.”7 The court disagreed, noting that taking “equal access” literally was inconsistent to the court’s holdings that no fundamental right is implicated when the General Assembly enacts legislation for the “good of the whole,” at the expense of a few. Pursuant to the equal protection clause, legislative actions that do not affect a fundamental right or suspect class, such as race or national origin, are subject to a “minimal scrutiny” analysis. Under minimal scrutiny, a statute merely has to bear a reasonable relationship to public health, safety, or welfare. Riley argued that because there were other interstate regulations in place limiting the poundage of species that could be harvested, the state statues limiting entry into the fishery were unnecessary. The court had to determine whether limiting entry into the fishery was a rational means to achieve a legitimate goal. The court noted that preserving the state’s natural resources for the good of the whole was a not only a legitimate goal, but a constitutional duty of the General Assembly. Furthermore, regulating the access to different species of fish was a rational means of protecting not only the viability of the stocks and the fishing industry, but also was for the well-being of the people of the state. Conclusion The court upheld the statutory scheme as constitutional, finding that the objectives of the statutory scheme are legitimate and limiting the entry of new licenses is a rational way to achieve the goal of preserving the state’s marine fisheries. Endnotes 1. R.I. Gen Laws § 20-2.2-5(1)(i) (2008). 2. Riley v. R.I. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt., 941 A.2d 198, 206 (R.I. 2008) 3. Id. at 207. 4. Id. 5. R.I. Const. art. 1, sec. 17. 6. Riley, 941 A.2d 198, 208. 7. Id. at 210.
Phone (662) 915-7775 • Fax (662) 915-5267 • 256 Kinard Hall, Wing E, University, MS 38677-1848

Riley v. Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management, 941 A.2d 198 (R.I. 2008).

Terra Bowling, J.D.

In a constitutional challenge to Rhode Island’s limited-entry fishing licensing scheme, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has held that statutory limits on entry into the state’s fishery do not the violate the right to pursue a lawful occupation or the right to a free fishery.

Background

When Steven Riley applied to the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management (DEM) for a principal effort fishing license, the department denied his application, citing the fact that Riley did not have a prior license. Rhode Island’s Commercial Fishing Licenses Act of 2000 allows only those holding a valid principal-effort or multipurpose license before December 31, 2002 to receive a “new” principal-effort license.1

Although the Department denied Riley’s application for the principal effort license, it approved Riley for another, less lucrative, entry-level commercial fishing license. Despite this, Riley filed suit, claiming that his constitutional rights were violated because the entry-level license did not give him the same rights to fish for the same species as other commercial fishermen. The lower court granted summary judgment in favor of the DEM.

Right to Pursue a Lawful Occupation

On appeal, the court first addressed Riley’s claim that the denial of the preferred license violated the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by denying his fundamental right to pursue a common occupation of life. The court looked at whether a fundamental right was, in fact, involved.

The court recognized that the “liberty” provision in the due process clause includes “the right of the individual to engage in the common occupations of life . . .”2 However, in this instance, the court found that the statute did not restrict Riley’s right to pursue the occupation of commercial fisherman, given that he was granted a commercial fishing license. The fact that the license was less lucrative than the one he sought did not matter. The license he was approved for enabled him to harvest more than a hundred species of fish and other sea creatures.

Because no fundamental right was involved, Riley had to prove that there was a violation of substantive due process, which requires a plaintiff to prove that the law is “clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.”3 Riley was unable to prove that the law was arbitrary and unreasonable. The court noted that limiting the fishery to those who possessed a license prior to 2002 “has a real and substantial relationship to a legitimate governmental goal of limiting the number of licenses available to take restricted species.”4

Right of Fishery

Next, the court examined whether a fundamental constitutional right of fishery was implicated in the case. The court noted that the Rhode Island constitution guaranteed the “rights of fishery” to the people of the state.5 Furthermore, the state courts have consistently held “that the right of fishery in Rhode Island belongs to the general public, and to no particular individual.”6 However, the court did examine whether the General Assembly acted within its power granted to it by the state constitution in regulating the fishery.

Riley argued that because the statute only allowed some commercial fishermen to take restricted species, it denied other citizens equal access to the fishery in violation of their constitutional rights. Essentially, Riley thought that the right of equal access required that “either everyone is permitted to harvest the same species, or no one is.”7 The court disagreed, noting that taking “equal access” literally was inconsistent to the court’s holdings that no fundamental right is implicated when the General Assembly enacts legislation for the “good of the whole,” at the expense of a few.

Pursuant to the equal protection clause, legislative actions that do not affect a fundamental right or suspect class, such as race or national origin, are subject to a “minimal scrutiny” analysis. Under minimal scrutiny, a statute merely has to bear a reasonable relationship to public health, safety, or welfare. Riley argued that because there were other interstate regulations in place limiting the poundage of species that could be harvested, the state statues limiting entry into the fishery were unnecessary. The court had to determine whether limiting entry into the fishery was a rational means to achieve a legitimate goal. The court noted that preserving the state’s natural resources for the good of the whole was a not only a legitimate goal, but a constitutional duty of the General Assembly. Furthermore, regulating the access to different species of fish was a rational means of protecting not only the viability of the stocks and the fishing industry, but also was for the well-being of the people of the state.

Conclusion
The court upheld the statutory scheme as constitutional, finding that the objectives of the statutory scheme are legitimate and limiting the entry of new licenses is a rational way to achieve the goal of preserving the state’s marine fisheries.

Endnotes

1. R.I. Gen Laws § 20-2.2-5(1)(i) (2008).

2. Riley v. R.I. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt., 941 A.2d 198, 206 (R.I. 2008)

3. Id. at 207.

4. Id.

5. R.I. Const. art. 1, sec. 17.

6. Riley, 941 A.2d 198, 208.

7. Id. at 210.