Supreme Court Rules EPA’s Denial to Regulate Greenhouse Gases Arbitrary

Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. 1438 (2007).

Sarah Spigener, 3L, University of Mississippi School of Law

In an opinion by Justice Stevens, the United States Supreme Court held that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has the statutory authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles. The Court also ruled that Massachusetts had standing to challenge the EPA, given that the state would suffer direct harm from the further loss of its coastal land due to climate change.

Background
Based on research that a rise in global temperatures and climate changes have resulted from a significant increase of “greenhouse gases” in the atmosphere, private organizations petitioned the EPA to begin regulating the emissions of four such gases, including carbon dioxide, from new motor vehicles under § 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act. The organizations claimed that the EPA had authority to take this action, because the agency itself had already confirmed such authority in an earlier statement by the EPA’s general counsel. The EPA rejected the petition and concluded that it did not have statutory authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles and that, even if it did, it would not currently exercise that authority.

The organizations, joined by twelve states, three cities, and an American territory, sought review of the EPA’s decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. First, the EPA contended that the petitioners lacked standing1 to bring this case before the court. The plaintiffs, in response, claimed that they did have standing and presented numerous examples of future damage caused by global warming that would occur as a result of these emissions. The court of appeals did not address the standing issue.

Second, the plaintiffs challenged the EPA’s decision not to exercise its authority to compose regulations “until more is understood about the causes, extent and significance of climate change and the potential options for addressing it.”2 The plaintiffs claimed that the EPA’s decision rested solely on scientific uncertainty. The court of appeals disagreed and stated that the EPA also correctly based its decision on policy judgments. The court of appeals held that the EPA Administrator properly exercised his discretion under the Clean Air Act in denying the petition.

Standing
The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court and contended that the EPA abdicated its responsibility under the Clean Air Act to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases and asked the Court to answer two questions concerning the meaning of § 202(a)(1) of the Act: whether the EPA has the statutory authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles; and, if so, whether its stated reasons for refusing to do so are consistent with the statute. The EPA, now supported by ten states and six trade associations, repeated its contention that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring these claims before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court stated that only one of the plaintiffs must have standing for the Court to consider a petition for review. To have standing, a plaintiff must meet three elements: the plaintiff must have suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is either actual or imminent; the injury must be fairly traceable to the defendant; and, it must be likely that a favorable decision will redress that injury.
The Court held that the state of Massachusetts meets the standing requirements because Massachusetts owns a large portion of the territory that is to be affected by these alleged climate changes. The Court reasoned that the EPA’s refusal to regulate these emissions presents a risk of harm to Massachusetts that is actual and imminent. The harm Massachusetts claimed is that its coastal land had already succumbed to increased sea levels as a result of global warming and that this process will continue if sea levels continue to rise. Though minimal, the EPA’s refusal to regulate these emissions contributes to Massachusetts’ injuries. The Court further recognized that even though regulating emissions would not reverse global warming, that did not mean that the Court could not consider whether or not EPA has a duty to act to slow or reduce it.

Statutory Authority to Regulate
The Supreme Court considered whether the Clean Air Act authorizes the EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles when the EPA determines that such emissions contribute to climate change. The Court concluded that it does. Section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act states that the EPA “shall by regulation prescribe . . . standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from . . . new motor vehicles . . . which in the Administrator’s judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”3

The EPA contended that carbon dioxide, one of the greenhouse gases contested in this case, was not an “air pollutant” as defined in the above provision. The Court disagreed and stated that the statute was unambiguous and that the definition of “air pollutant” includes any air pollutant, including carbon dioxide. The EPA also argued that Congress enacted other legislation that amounted to a congressional command to refrain from regulating greenhouse gas emissions. However, the Court pointed out that the EPA did not identify any specific congressional action in accordance with its contention.

The EPA finally argued that it could not regulate these emissions because doing so would require the EPA to tighten mileage standards, a duty within the scope of the Department of Transportation (DOT). The Court disregarded this argument and stated that though the two obligations might overlap, the two agencies could work together. Therefore, after considering the various arguments of the EPA, the Court concluded that the EPA does have authority to regulate the emission of such gases from new motor vehicles.

Exercise of Authority
The EPA also contended that even if it did have the authority to regulate, it would be unwise to do so at this time. The Court analyzed the Clean Air Act and determined that the EPA could avoid taking further action on a petition only if it determines that greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate change or if it provides some reasonable explanation as to why it cannot or will not exercise its discretion to determine whether they do. The Court invalidated the policy judgments that the EPA relied on to form its conclusion because policy had nothing to do with whether greenhouse gas emissions contribute to climate change. The Court further stated that the EPA cannot rely on uncertainty surrounding features of climate change to justify its actions. The Court concluded that there is no reasonable explanation for the EPA’s refusal to decide the issue and that the EPA’s action was arbitrary and capricious. The Court further mandated that, on remand, the EPA must base its reasons for action or inaction in the statute.

Conclusion
The Supreme Court disagreed with the EPA and held that the plaintiffs, particularly Massachusetts, did have standing to challenge the EPA’s denial of their rulemaking petition. The Court determined that the EPA has the authority, given by Congress, to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles. The Court further held that the EPA, on remand, must state its grounds for denying the petition.

Endnotes
1. Standing is a party’s right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right. Black’s Law Dictionary 661 (8th ed. 2004).
2. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
3. 42 U.S.C.S. § 7521(a)(1).

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