District Court Allows Evidence Obtained by Coast Guard

United States of America v. Vilches-Navarrette, 413 F. Supp. 2d 60 (D. P.R. 2006).

Terra Bowling, J.D.

In March 2005, the search of a freighter by the U.S. Coast Guard netted more than 2,000 pounds of cocaine and lead to the indictment of its crew members. Relying on the Fourth Amendment, the crew members moved to dismiss the indictments and to suppress evidence seized by the Coast Guard, as well as to suppress statements made by some of the defendants. The U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico denied the motion to dismiss, as well as the motions to suppress the evidence and statements.

Background
On January 31, 2005, the Coast Guard, acting on intelligence, instructed one of its cutters to intercept and board the 165-foot M/V Babouth off the coast of Trinidad and Tobago. Upon approaching the vessel, U.S. Coast guardsmen asked for and received permission to board. The officers began a search of the vessel at sea, which lasted for five days during which the Coast Guard found more than 17 grams of amphetamines and 58 grams of heroin. The Coast Guard was then directed to take the freighter to San Juan, Puerto Rico where agents from various federal agencies began searching the vessel. A canine unit from Customs and Border Protection alerted the searchers to the presence of narcotics; however, the search team was unsuccessful in locating them.
As the search continued the next day, one of the freighter’s crew members, Luis Fernando Piedrahita-Calle, threw a note to a Coast Guardsman and indicated that he wanted to talk. On direction from Piedrahita-Calle, the team located several vinyl tiles that had been adhered to the deck with fresh contact cement. Under the tiles, the team found a tank that held thirty-five bales of cocaine, totaling approximately 2,030 pounds. The crew members were then arrested and read their Miranda rights. During questioning, two crew members made incriminating statements to law enforcement officials. All of the crew members were later indicted for conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine.

Motion to Dismiss
The defendants argued for dismissal on several grounds. First, the defendants claimed that the case should be dismissed because the search was not based on probable cause, violating the Fourth Amendment. However, the court noted that the remedy for a search and seizure without probable cause is exclusion of the evidence wrongfully seized or obtained, not dismissal.

Next, the defendants claimed that the case should be dismissed due to the unreasonable delay in seeing a judge and the unreasonable period of time that they were detained. If true, the government’s actions would have violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a), as well as the Fourth Amendment. Rule 5(a) states that “any person making an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before the nearest available federal magistrate.”1 The Fourth Amendment has been interpreted to compel a 48-hour time limit on detentions when there has not been a ruling on probable cause.2 However, before either rule is triggered, individuals must be arrested and not merely detained. The crew members argued that they were arrested when the Coast Guard boarded the freighter, so the five-day trip at sea and a two-day dockside search in San Juan violated the rules. The court rejected the defendants’ argument, as case law has determined that a routine boarding of a vessel on the high seas is not an arrest.3

The court noted that even if the arrest had occurred when the Coast Guard boarded the freighter, neither the 48-hour rule nor Rule 5(a) would apply. The court said that the trip from the high seas to Puerto Rico took a reasonable amount of time, so the delay that the crew members faced was not an “unnecessary delay,” which is what Rule 5(a) requires. In examining a violation of the 48-hour rule, the court found that even if the defendants were considered to be under arrest when the ship was moored on February 5 and they were not taken to the judge until more than two days later, the rule did not apply because the government may show a bona fide emergency or special circumstance justifying the delay.4 In this case, the court felt that the enormous size of the freighter and the complexity of the search were circumstances that justified the slight delay in the defendants seeing a judge.

Motion to Suppress
The crew members next argued that the cocaine on board the freighter was the fruit of an illegal search and should be suppressed pursuant to the Fourth Amendment. The court first found that under U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, the defendants did not have the protection of the Fourth Amendment while at sea, because they are non-residents of the United States located in international waters or a foreign territory.5 The court also found that the defendants did not receive Fourth Amendment protection for the search at San Juan, because the foreign-flagged ship would be considered the functional equivalent of the flag nation. Since the ship was sailing under Honduras’ flag, the Coast Guard search would be similar to a search conducted in a foreign territory. Additionally, the court noted that, even if the ship was not considered to be a foreign territory, the defendants would be required to have a substantial connection with the United States before they could take advantage of the Fourth Amendment.6 The court found that the crew members’ presence in the United States while on a ship would not be enough to establish a substantial connection.

The court also found that even if the Fourth Amendment was applicable to the crew members, they lacked standing to challenge the search. In order to invoke the right to be free from unreasonable searches, an individual must have “manifested a subjective expectation of privacy” in the place searched, which “society accepts as objectively reasonable.”7 The court found that neither the captain nor the crew had an expectation of privacy in the area of the ship where the cocaine was found, pointing out that the large size of the vessel presented few areas in which there could be an expectation of privacy. Even if the crew had an expectation of privacy, the court doubted that it would be one that society would accept as objectively reasonable, since the compartment was hidden and created for the express purpose of hiding illicit contraband.

Furthermore, even if the Fourth Amendment was applicable and the crew members had standing, the court found that the search was reasonable due to the Coast Guard’s broad authority to stop and board a vessel. The Coast Guard may conduct a search “upon reasonable and articulable grounds for suspecting that the vessel or those on board are engaging in criminal activities.”8 In light of the intelligence that the Coast Guard had received and the surrounding circumstances, the court found that the search of the ship was reasonable.

Conclusion
The court denied all of the defendants’ motions to dismiss and to suppress, allowing the government to present its case. The defendants also moved to suppress the statements made by crew members during the search. The court reserved its ruling on this motion until the statements could be evaluated in context during the trial.

Endnotes
1. Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(a).
2. McLaughlin v. County of Riverside, 500 U.S. 44, 111 (1991).
3. U.S. v. Elkins, 774 F.2d 530, 535 n. 3 (1st Cir. 1985).
4. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 57.
5. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 267 (1990).
6. Id. at 271.
7. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988).
8. U.S. v. Green, 671 F.2d at 53 (1982).