Washington
Court Protects Public Access to Tidelands on Bainbridge Island
City
of Bainbridge Island v. Brennan, 2005 Wash. App. LEXIS 1744 (Wash. App.
July 20, 2005).
Sabena
Singh, 3L, South Texas College of Law
On July 20, 2005,
the Court of Appeals of Washington held that a dedicated right-of-way
laid out to navigable waters is presumed to provide access to the waters
edge.
Facts
Bainbridge Island, located 35 minutes by ferry from Seattle, is home
to quiet harbors, farms, and a rich history. Bainbridge Island grew
from a small town of two square miles with 3,147 people to a bustling
community of 20,920. Over the years, it has managed to uphold its friendly
aura, small town charm, and natural environments.
In 1898, Peder Erlandsen purchased 32 acres on Bainbridge Island, which
adjoined, but did not include, the tidelands of Fletcher Bay. Over the
years, a county road was built across Erlandsens property to provide
access to the beach and later a wharf that extended from the end of
the road into the bay. In 1911, Erlandsen dedicated for public use all
the streets and avenues on his property, which included the county road.
Soon thereafter, Erlandsen received title to all of the tidelands adjoining
his property.
A few years later, a private ferry company began providing service between
Fletcher Bay and the Kitsap Peninsula. Customers accessed the ferry
via the county road and the wharf. In 1923, Erlandsen dedicated an additional
40-foot right-of-way to accommodate a change in the county roads
route following a county improvement project. The public frequently
used the wharf and the surrounding beach to dig clams and moor their
boats, even after the ferry service was discontinued in 1941 and the
wharf dismantled.
Erlandsen died in 1943 and his property, including the tidelands, was
eventually subdivided. Some of the new lot owners began challenging
the publics use of the tidelands going so far as to build a fence
and erecting a locked gate to blocked access.
In 1999, the City of Bainbridge Island (City) which had acquired an
undivided 2/20 interest in the tidelands, sued to quiet title to the
road and tidelands. The trial court quieted title in favor of the City
holding that the land-based portion of Fletcher Landing was dedicated
to the public as a public road right-of-way to the western edge of the
concrete bulkhead built in 1924 and still presently on site.1
A few of the record owners of tideland parcels appealed.
Dedication
to Public Use
Appellants made several claims on appeal. First, appellants contended
that the City failed to prove that Erlandsen intended to dedicate the
tidelands to public use. Under Washington state law, a dedication
is generally defined as the devotion of property to a public use by
an unequivocal act of the owner, manifesting an intention that it shall
be accepted and used presently or in the future.2 The elements that indicate a dedication are (1) intention of the owner
to dedicate and (2) acceptance by the public. The court determined that
Erlandsens conduct before and after he purchased the tidelands
indicated his intention to dedicate them for public use and that the
public accepted this dedication. The court cited well-established Washington
law that when a public highway is laid out to navigable waters,
its terminus is presumed to be a public landing as incident to the highway.3
Since the public frequently used the tidelands, the court found that
the two elements were clearly satisfied.
The record owners also argued that they were bona fide purchasers for
value and therefore entitled to exclusive use of the property. Under
Washington law, where there is an apparent dedication to public
use, or where such a dedication may be inferred or suggested from the
condition of the property, the purchaser is put on notice and cannot
defeat the right of the public therein, should such a right in fact
exist; and this is so regardless of the state of the record title or
of the recitals in his deed.4 This court agreed
with the trial courts finding that the record owners had knowledge
of the lands dedication for public use, and were therefore put
on notice and could not defeat the right of the public. The court reasoned
that the physical attributes and location of the property should have
put appellants on notice that the land was dedicated for public use
or, at the very least, put them on notice of the need to inquire further.
Public Trust Doctrine
A cross appeal was filed by the Larsons who owned waterfront property
close to the tidelands. Because of their propertys steep bank,
they used the tidelands to launch their small boats and gain access
to the tide flats. The Larsons claimed they had a right to use the tidelands
for recreational purposes based on the public trust doctrine. Developing
out of the publics need for access to navigable water, the public
trust doctrine protects public ownership interests in certain
uses of navigable waters and underlying lands.5
The doctrine reserves a public property interest in tidelands and the
waters flowing over them despite the sale of these lands into private
ownership.
The Washington Supreme Court has never considered pedestrian passage
over tidelands. Although the appeals court recognized the right of the
Larsons to access the tide flats under the public trust doctrine for
navigation, commerce, fisheries, recreation, and environmental
quality, it affirmed the dismissal of the Larsons claims
to pedestrian travel over privately-owned tidelands when not covered
by water. The court stated that under the public trust doctrine, the
public is allowed to use the neighboring tidelands when covered by water,
but when the tide is out, the public has no right to walk across private
property.
Conclusion
In sum, under Washington law, a dedicated right-of-way laid out to navigable
waters is presumed to provide access to the waters edge. The court
also found that the public trust doctrine does not extend to protect
pedestrian travel over privately-owned tidelands when not covered by
water.
Endnotes
1. City of Bainbridge Island v. Brennan, 2005
Wash. App. LEXIS 1744 at *11 (Wash. App. July 20, 2005).
2. Id. at *13.
3. Id. at *28.
4. Id.
5. 40 C.F.R. § 132.4(h).
6. Id. at *59.
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