Dolphin-Safe
Tuna Label Safe for Now
Earth Island Institute v. Evans, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15729 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2004).
Maureen
McGowan1
On August 9, 2004,
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California rejected
the Commerce Departments efforts to weaken the dolphin-safe
tuna labeling program. In a scathing decision the court accused the
administration of sacrificing science for politics by failing to complete
required scientific studies before determining that there would be no
significant impact to the dolphin population by changing the tuna labeling
standards. The court found as a matter of law that the final finding
of the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary) must be set aside, and the
definition of dolphin-safe should remain unchanged.
Background
Yellowfin tuna in the eastern tropical Pacific (ETP) often swim below
schools of dolphins, and a fishing technique was developed where purse
seine nets were placed on dolphins in order to catch the tuna. This
method, which involves chasing and netting dolphins and tuna in mile-long
nets, decimated the dolphin population by killing over seven million
animals since the early 1950s. In response to public outcry Congress
passed the Marine Mammal Protection Act in 1972, which prohibited U.S.
fishing boats from dropping nets on dolphins, and then imposed the same
standard on foreign imports in the 1980s.
In 1992, Congress
passed the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act, creating the
dolphin-safe label for tuna caught without netting dolphins.
Over the twelve years that the labeling program has been in effect,
dolphin deaths have decreased by 98 percent in the ETP.2 However, by selling only dolphin-safe tuna, major U.S. tuna
processors effectively banned imports from Mexico and other Latin American
companies with large tuna fleets. Those nations that lost a huge part
of their market due to the higher standards, as well as other nations
fishing in the ETP, joined together in the International Dolphin Conservation
Program in 1992. Eventually a binding agreement, the Panama Declaration,
was formalized, in which the U.S. agreed to ease embargoes and improve
market access for ETP tuna coming from Mexico and other Latin American
fleets.
In 1997, the International
Dolphin Conservation Program Act (IDCPA) authorized the dolphin-safe
label to be applied to tuna caught in nets that trap and release dolphins
when shipboard observers found that no dolphins were harmed or killed,
but only if the Commerce Department concluded after conducting studies
that the trap and release process does not harm depleted dolphin populations.
The law required the Secretary of Commerce to conduct a population abundance
study and three different stress studies in order to determine whether
chase and encirclement with purse seine nets is having a significant
adverse impact on the dolphins in the ETP.
Initial findings were issued by the Secretary on May 7, 1999, stating
that there was insufficient evidence that chase and encirclement
by the tuna purse seine industry is having a significant adverse
impact on depleted dolphin stocks in the ETP.3 The Secretary was prevented from lessening the dolphin-safe
standard based on his initial findings after environmental groups successfully
challenged the findings. The Ninth Circuit held that the Secretary was
required to affirmatively find that the fishery either was or
was not having a significant adverse impact, and could not rely on insufficient
evidence to default to a finding of no significant adverse impact
. . . Such an approach would discourage proactive fact-finding and research.4
Preliminary
Injunction
In 2002, the Secretary issued his final findings, determining that the
intentional deployment on or encirclement of dolphins with purse seines
is not having a significant adverse effect on any depleted dolphin stock
in the ETP.5 Based on these findings the dolphin-safe
label was redefined to include tuna caught when dolphins were trapped
and released, but not killed.
In response to the
weakening of the dolphin-safe standard Earth Island Institute,
the Humane Society of the United States, the ASPCA, Defenders of Wildlife,
and several other environmental groups filed suit against Donald Evans,
the Secretary of Commerce, to enjoin the administration from changing
the dolphin-safe standard until the administrative record
could be completed. The court found that a preliminary injunction was
appropriate because the plaintiffs would likely succeed on the merits
of the case, and the public interest weighed in favor of maintaining
the status quo pending resolution of the case.6
In the meantime, major U.S. brands (Starkist, Chicken of the Sea, and
Bumble Bee) had already declared that they will not buy tuna caught
by chasing and netting dolphins, regardless of what happens to the labeling
standards.
Summary Judgment under the Administrative Procedure
Act
The Administrative Record was completed in June 2004 and the parties
went back to the Northern District Court on cross-motions for summary
judgment. In order to succeed on their motion for summary judgment,
Earth Island Institute (EII) would have to show that the Secretarys
final finding was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with the law. The burden would
be on EII to demonstrate that (1) the Secretarys explanation for
his decision runs counter to the evidence before the agency, (2) the
agency relied on facts which Congress did not intend it to consider,
or (3) the agency entirely failed to consider an important aspect of
the problem. While there is considerable deference given to an agency,
it is not unlimited and the courts will conduct a searching and
careful inquiry into agency decisions.7
Congressionally
Mandated Research
Congress specifically rejected language in the IDCPA that would have
automatically changed the labeling standards, and instead required the
Secretary to conduct several scientific studies to determine the effects
that trap-and-release fishing were having on the depleted dolphin populations
in the ETP before making any decisions. Through mandatory and
direct language Congress required the Secretary to carry out three
stress studies: (1) a series of necropsies (comparable to a human autopsy),
(2) a review of historical demographic and biological data, and (3)
an experimental chase and encirclement stress study (CHESS). In prior
decisions, the Secretary was expressly warned that he could not
fail to comply with the required research and then invoke a lack
of stress-related information to trigger a change in the dolphin-safe
label standard.8
Best
Available Scientific Evidence
The applicable standard, requiring the Secretary to evaluate best available
scientific evidence, does not demand conclusive evidence and is
intended to give the benefit of the doubt to the species.9 In this case the best available scientific evidence consisted of the
Final Science Report and the reports from two scientific panels. The
Secretary adopted an Organized Decision Process, and focused
on four different questions when making his final finding: (1)
whether there have been changes to the ETP ecosystem that have affected
the ability of depleted dolphin stocks to recover, (2) current direct
mortality levels, (3) whether stress or other indirect effects of the
fishery are affecting the ability of dolphin stocks to recover, and
(4) the growth rates of depleted dolphins stocks.10 On every question the Secretary tried to spin the relevant data in support
of the position that the depleted dolphin stocks are not being adversely
affected by the fishery; however the court found that virtually all
of the best available scientific evidence points towards the fishery
having a significant adverse impact.11
Integrity
of the Decision-Making Process
Both the Northern District Court and the Ninth Circuit held that the
Secretary could base his final findings [only] on the best available
scientific data, and without deference to trade politics or competing
policy viewpoints.12 Yet the evidence indicated
that the Secretary was persuaded by political and diplomatic concerns
unrelated to the scientific data, particularly the influences of the
U.S. Department of State and Mexico. The court stated that it was convinced
that the Secretarys decision-making process was infected by the
very policy considerations that Congress had directed should not be
considered.13
Conclusion
In his 24 years on the bench, the judge claimed he had [never]
reviewed a record of agency action that contained such a compelling
portrait of political meddling.14 The best scientific
evidence indicates that (1) dolphin stocks are still severely
depleted and are not recovering despite extremely low reported mortality
rates, (2) that their recovery is being risked or appreciably delayed,
(3) that changes to the ecosystem are unlikely to explain this phenomena,
and (4) that indirect effects from the fishery can plausibly account
for the lack of recovery.15 In spite of the
evidence, the Secretary made a final finding that the intentional
deployment on or encirclement of dolphins with purse seine nets is not
having a significant adverse effect on any depleted dolphin stock in
the ETP.16 Earth Island Institute successfully
demonstrated that the Secretarys offered explanation for its decision
ran counter to the evidence before the agency and that the agency relied
on facts which Congress did not intend it to consider. Therefore, for
now, the dolphin-safe labeling standard will remain as it
has been for the past twelve years.
Endnotes
1. Maureen is a third-year law student at the University
of Georgia School of Law.
2. Mark J. Palmer, Earth Island Sues Again to Save Dolphins,
Earth Island Journal, June 22, 2003, at 19.
3. Earth Island Institute v. Evans, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15729 at *10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2004).
4. Id. at *11.
5. Id. at *15.
6. Earth Island Institute v. Evans, 256 F.Supp.2d 1064,
1068 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
7. Earth Island Institute, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15729
at *21.
8. Id. at *24.
9. Id. at *95.
10. Id. at *36-37.
11. Id. at *38.
12. Id. at *77.
13. Id. at *92.
14. Id. at *78.
15. Id. at *95-96.
16. Id. at *98.
|
|