Gulf Oil Spill Reports Released

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SandBar 10.3, July, 2011 Recommended citation: Ellen Burgin, BP and Natural Resource Trustees Enter Billion Dollar Agreement to Restore Gulf, 10:3 SandBar 8 (2011). Gulf Oil Spill Reports Released Ellen Burgin , 2013 J.D. Candidate, University of Mississippi School of Law *National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling Report to the President, Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling* (Jan. 2011). On January 11, 2011, the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil and Offshore Drilling released a 380-page report extensively outlining the cause of the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe and what can be done to avoid a similar occurrence in the future. The first chapter provides a vivid account of April 20, 2010 through the words of workers who experienced the disaster. The report then recapitulates the history of offshore drilling, from technological advances to the rise of BP in the industry. The report also documents the increase of the oil industry’s power and influence. After detailing the mechanics of deepwater offshore drilling, the report summarizes the precise drilling activities of the Macondo well, including complications such as the incomplete cement job at the base of the well. The Commission questions certain BP safety protocols and the actions of workers who overlooked test results that provided warning signs. Citing a legacy of inefficient federal regulation as a major contributing factor, the Commission scrutinizes the Minerals Management Service’s (MMS) failure to demand adequate safety compliance. Ultimately, the report attributes fault to both the industry and government mismanagement. The report also evaluates the emergency response and containment efforts to minimize the oil spill through the implementation of the National Contingency Plan and BP’s own attempts. The report concludes that insufficient remedial technology and lack of expertise from MMS complicated and delayed stopping the oil flow. The report details both the overall environmental impacts and economic consequences of the spill. Report findings describe the reactions of Gulf coast government leaders and the concerns of their communities, such as loss of income and health risks to people and animals. The Commission’s report proposes significant changes to re-vamp safety precautions in an attempt to restore confidence in the industry and ensure its continued survival. The history of BP’s “safety culture” and past BP accidents are used to emphasize that there were recurring safety problems; a company policy change was long overdue. To emphasize the large scope of change needed throughout the entire industry, the Commission highlights the necessary and widespread interaction between many companies needed to run a rig. Although the American Petroleum Institute (API) creates safety protocol for the industry, the report criticizes its double role as the industry’s main lobbyist. Despite major incidents in the past, such as Exxon Valdez, there has been no significant improvement in industry response to oil spills. The Commission provides a thorough list of potential improvements to safety areas and then specific recommendations that the industry can implement. These include improving offshore operation safety through stricter safety standards and a new regulatory agency ensuring protection of the environment strengthening planning methodology for emergency responses, and developing more in-depth technology to contain well flow. As a result of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the Commission calls for more research on the impact of spills in deepwater, meeting human health needs, restoring consumer confidence, and obtaining funding for long-term restoration efforts in the Gulf. Here, the Commission suggests that 80% of funds collected from the Clean Water Act violations should go toward this purpose. The report also stresses increasing measures of financial responsibility for incidents and encouraging more Congressional oversight involvement. The final section of the report analyzes how important oil is to the United States and the implications of national energy policy changes. There remain other areas for oil exploration, such as the Arctic, in which lessons learned from Deepwater Horizon and improvements in the general industry will most certainly prove beneficial. http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/final-report Ray Mabus, U.S. Navy Secretary, America’s Gulf Coast: A Long Term Recovery Plan after the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (Sept. 2010). On September 28, 2010, Navy Secretary Ray Mabus submitted a restoration plan for the Gulf oil spill to the President. Throughout his report, the Secretary of the Navy emphasizes the significance of continuing to remember the impact of the Deepwater Horizon spill because the Gulf will be recovering for quite some time. The accident was an environmental catastrophe on a scale that the Gulf has never experienced, so the need for a “seamless transition from response to recovery” is of utmost importance. The report briefly focuses on the statistics of the crisis that put an estimated 4.9 million barrels of oil into Gulf waters before summarizing the federal government response. The majority of the report concentrates on future measures for recovery, divided into five topics: Congressional authorization of Clean Water Act penalties; long-term ecosystem restoration; health and human services recovery; economic recovery; and nonprofit sector recovery. The report further explains in detail the recovery strategy for last four categories, as proposed by different recovery groups. Each section begins with a list of preexisting problems in the Gulf region and proceeds to describe Deepwater Horizon’s added impact. Next, the report lists the principles and specific directives that will help achieve the ultimate goal of returning to baseline conditions in the Gulf. Much of this work will be carried out by two new entities: the Gulf Coast Recovery Council and the Ecosystem Restoration Task Force. http://media.al.com/pr/other/gulf-reconstruction-plan-2010.pdf** BP Internal Investigation Team, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report (Sept. 8, 2010). Following the Macondo well blowout, BP undertook an internal investigation of the accident. The internal investigation lasted four months and was led by Mark Bly, the Head of Safety and Operations. Comprising the bulk of the team were more than fifty specialists, coming from both inside and outside BP. The report summarized the chain of events of April 20, 2010 that led to the accident and stressed that the Deepwater Horizon accident cannot be traced to one identifiable mistake. BP concluded that due to a defect in the cement at the bottom of the well, hydrocarbons escaped and rose within the piping. Workers on the rig misread test results and the pressure continued to increase, while the gas continued rising. Once the gas reached the surface, the mud-gas separator did not displace the hydrocarbons overboard and when the gas entered the engine room, there was ignition and resultant explosions and fires. Once the two explosions occurred, the blow-out preventer at the bottom of the well failed to function properly and the well continued to pump. The BP report suggested faulty safety devices, overlooked test results, and inadequate cement work were complications that led to the explosion. BP also formulated twenty-five initiatives to strengthen future safety precautions. The interaction between BP, Transocean, and Haliburton has been described as an on-going “blame game” since each company denies the full extent of its contribution to the disaster. Transocean and Haliburton both found issue with the report, claiming that BP was minimizing its impact on the event. Several other organizations and officials simultaneously conducted similar investigations. http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/gom_response/STAGING/local_assets/downloads_pdfs/ Deepwater_Horizon_Accident_Investigation_Report.pdf Det Norske Veritas, Final Report for the U.S. Department of the Interior: Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement, No. EP030842, Forensic Examination of Deepwater Horizon Blowout Preventer (Mar. 20, 2011) In March, Det Norske Veritas, an independent company, submitted a report on the Deepwater Horizon blowout to the U.S. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE). The report contained “a forensic examination, investigation, testing and scientific evaluation of the blowout preventer, its components and associated equipment used by the Deepwater Horizon drilling operation.” Its primary objectives were to evaluate the blowout preventer’s (BOP) performance, construct a timeline of the failures, and calculate the impact of BP and Transocean modifications performed earlier on the BOP stack. To conduct this report, the BOP was raised from the sea floor on September 4, 2010. The report designated the primary cause of the BOP’s failure was the failure of the blind shear rams (BSRs) to close. Two components of the blowout preventer, the upper variable bore rams (VBRs) and the Upper Annular, had initially closed, which caused the pressure to build up. A drill pipe tool joint driven into the Upper Annular by the force of the flow caused the pipe to buckle under the force. Because part of the drill pipe was trapped, the BSRs did not close. The BSR blade therefore did not align with the pipe and complete sealing of the well did not occur. The company recommends numerous studies to make improvements in the industry, such as a study on elastic buckling, shear bald surfaces of shear rams, well control procedures, back-up control systems, emergency function, and the effectiveness of Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROVs) intervention. http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/external/content/document/3043/1047291/1/ DNV%20Report%20EP030842%20for%20BOEMRE%20Volume%20I.pdf *Operational Science Advisory Team (OSAT-2) & Gulf Coast Incident Management Team, Summary Report for Fate and Effects of Remnant Oil in the Beach Environment* (Feb. 10, 2011. In February 2011, the Gulf Coast Incident Management Team, a group consisting of representatives from Gulf states, federal agencies, and BP, released a report to serve as a guidance for adjustments in beach cleanup procedures. Other investigations concern the overall impact of the oil spill on the environment as a whole. This report documents the impact of three different types of oil left from the spill in water (tar mats) and on the shore (tar bars and buried oil) along the Gulf coast in various locations. These locations include: Grand Isle, Louisiana; Petit Bois Island, Mississippi; Bon Secour, Alabama; and Fort Pickens, Florida. In each of these locations, a net environmental benefit analysis evaluated the negative effects of beach cleanup on the resource itself and wildlife. The report also compared the impact on human health against Environmental Protection Agency data benchmarks. Generally, the results of the report indicate that cleanups were often more damaging than the remnant oil’s effect on the environment. Additional findings show that oil is unlikely to infiltrate groundwater. Although cleanups may have a negative impact, failure to adequately clean beaches results in its own threats, including: adult shorebirds consuming tarballs, and buried oil affecting sea turtle eggs and young survival. http://www.restorethegulf.gov/ sites/default/files/u316/OSAT-2%20Report%20no%20ltr.pdf**
Phone (662) 915-7775 • Fax (662) 915-5267 • 256 Kinard Hall, Wing E, University, MS 38677-1848

SandBar 10.3, July, 2011
Recommended citation: Ellen Burgin, BP and Natural Resource Trustees Enter Billion Dollar Agreement to Restore Gulf, 10:3 SandBar 8 (2011).

Ellen Burgin , 2013 J.D. Candidate, University of Mississippi School of Law

National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling Report to the President, Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling (Jan. 2011).
      On January 11, 2011, the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil and Offshore Drilling released a 380-page report extensively outlining the cause of the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe and what can be done to avoid a similar occurrence in the future. The first chapter provides a vivid account of April 20, 2010 through the words of workers who experienced the disaster. The report then recapitulates the history of offshore drilling, from technological advances to the rise of BP in the industry. The report also documents the increase of the oil industry’s power and influence. After detailing the mechanics of deepwater offshore drilling, the report summarizes the precise drilling activities of the Macondo well, including complications such as the incomplete cement job at the base of the well. The Commission questions certain BP safety protocols and the actions of workers who overlooked test results that provided warning signs. Citing a legacy of inefficient federal regulation as a major contributing factor, the Commission scrutinizes the Minerals Management Service’s (MMS) failure to demand adequate safety compliance. Ultimately, the report attributes fault to both the industry and government mismanagement.
      The report also evaluates the emergency response and containment efforts to minimize the oil spill through the implementation of the National Contingency Plan and BP’s own attempts. The report concludes that insufficient remedial technology and lack of expertise from MMS complicated and delayed stopping the oil flow. The report details both the overall environmental impacts and economic consequences of the spill. Report findings describe the reactions of Gulf coast government leaders and the concerns of their communities, such as loss of income and health risks to people and animals.
      The Commission’s report proposes significant changes to re-vamp safety precautions in an attempt to restore confidence in the industry and ensure its continued survival. The history of BP’s “safety culture” and past BP accidents are used to emphasize that there were recurring safety problems; a company policy change was long overdue. To emphasize the large scope of change needed throughout the entire industry, the Commission highlights the necessary and widespread interaction between many companies needed to run a rig. Although the American Petroleum Institute (API) creates safety protocol for the industry, the report criticizes its double role as the industry’s main lobbyist. Despite major incidents in the past, such as Exxon Valdez, there has been no significant improvement in industry response to oil spills.
      The Commission provides a thorough list of potential improvements to safety areas and then specific recommendations that the industry can implement. These include improving offshore operation safety through stricter safety standards and a new regulatory agency ensuring protection of the environment strengthening planning methodology for emergency responses, and developing more in-depth technology to contain well flow. As a result of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the Commission calls for more research on the impact of spills in deepwater, meeting human health needs, restoring consumer confidence, and obtaining funding for long-term restoration efforts in the Gulf. Here, the Commission suggests that 80% of funds collected from the Clean Water Act violations should go toward this purpose. The report also stresses increasing measures of financial responsibility for incidents and encouraging more Congressional oversight involvement.
      The final section of the report analyzes how important oil is to the United States and the implications of national energy policy changes. There remain other areas for oil exploration, such as the Arctic, in which lessons learned from Deepwater Horizon and improvements in the general industry will most certainly prove beneficial.
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/final-report

Ray Mabus, U.S. Navy Secretary, America’s Gulf Coast: A Long Term Recovery Plan after the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (Sept. 2010).
On September 28, 2010, Navy Secretary Ray Mabus submitted a restoration plan for the Gulf oil spill to the President. Throughout his report, the Secretary of the Navy emphasizes the significance of continuing to remember the impact of the Deepwater Horizon spill because the Gulf will be recovering for quite some time. The accident was an environmental catastrophe on a scale that the Gulf has never experienced, so the need for a “seamless transition from response to recovery” is of utmost importance. The report briefly focuses on the statistics of the crisis that put an estimated 4.9 million barrels of oil into Gulf waters before summarizing the federal government response.
The majority of the report concentrates on future measures for recovery, divided into five topics: Congressional authorization of Clean Water Act penalties; long-term ecosystem restoration; health and human services recovery; economic recovery; and nonprofit sector recovery. The report further explains in detail the recovery strategy for last four categories, as proposed by different recovery groups. Each section begins with a list of preexisting problems in the Gulf region and proceeds to describe Deepwater Horizon’s added impact. Next, the report lists the principles and specific directives that will help achieve the ultimate goal of returning to baseline conditions in the Gulf. Much of this work will be carried out by two new entities: the Gulf Coast Recovery Council and the Ecosystem Restoration Task Force.
http://media.al.com/pr/other/gulf-reconstruction-plan-2010.pdf

BP Internal Investigation Team, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report (Sept. 8, 2010).
Following the Macondo well blowout, BP undertook an internal investigation of the accident. The internal investigation lasted four months and was led by Mark Bly, the Head of Safety and Operations. Comprising the bulk of the team were more than fifty specialists, coming from both inside and outside BP. The report summarized the chain of events of April 20, 2010 that led to the accident and stressed that the Deepwater Horizon accident cannot be traced to one identifiable mistake. BP concluded that due to a defect in the cement at the bottom of the well, hydrocarbons escaped and rose within the piping. Workers on the rig misread test results and the pressure continued to increase, while the gas continued rising. Once the gas reached the surface, the mud-gas separator did not displace the hydrocarbons overboard and when the gas entered the engine room, there was ignition and resultant explosions and fires. Once the two explosions occurred, the blow-out preventer at the bottom of the well failed to function properly and the well continued to pump.
The BP report suggested faulty safety devices, overlooked test results, and inadequate cement work were complications that led to the explosion. BP also formulated twenty-five initiatives to strengthen future safety precautions. The interaction between BP, Transocean, and Haliburton has been described as an on-going “blame game” since each company denies the full extent of its contribution to the disaster. Transocean and Haliburton both found issue with the report, claiming that BP was minimizing its impact on the event. Several other organizations and officials simultaneously conducted similar investigations.
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/gom_response/STAGING/local_assets/downloads_pdfs/
Deepwater_Horizon_Accident_Investigation_Report.pdf

Det Norske Veritas, Final Report for the U.S. Department of the Interior: Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement, No. EP030842, Forensic Examination of Deepwater Horizon Blowout Preventer (Mar. 20, 2011)
In March, Det Norske Veritas, an independent company, submitted a report on the Deepwater Horizon blowout to the U.S. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE). The report contained “a forensic examination, investigation, testing and scientific evaluation of the blowout preventer, its components and associated equipment used by the Deepwater Horizon drilling operation.” Its primary objectives were to evaluate the blowout preventer’s (BOP) performance, construct a timeline of the failures, and calculate the impact of BP and Transocean modifications performed earlier on the BOP stack. To conduct this report, the BOP was raised from the sea floor on September 4, 2010.
The report designated the primary cause of the BOP’s failure was the failure of the blind shear rams (BSRs) to close. Two components of the blowout preventer, the upper variable bore rams (VBRs) and the Upper Annular, had initially closed, which caused the pressure to build up. A drill pipe tool joint driven into the Upper Annular by the force of the flow caused the pipe to buckle under the force. Because part of the drill pipe was trapped, the BSRs did not close. The BSR blade therefore did not align with the pipe and complete sealing of the well did not occur. The company recommends numerous studies to make improvements in the industry, such as a study on elastic buckling, shear bald surfaces of shear rams, well control procedures, back-up control systems, emergency function, and the effectiveness of Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROVs) intervention.
http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/external/content/document/3043/1047291/1/
DNV%20Report%20EP030842%20for%20BOEMRE%20Volume%20I.pdf

Operational Science Advisory Team (OSAT-2) & Gulf Coast Incident Management Team, Summary Report for Fate and Effects of Remnant Oil in the Beach Environment (Feb. 10, 2011.
In February 2011, the Gulf Coast Incident Management Team, a group consisting of representatives from Gulf states, federal agencies, and BP, released a report to serve as a guidance for adjustments in beach cleanup procedures. Other investigations concern the overall impact of the oil spill on the environment as a whole. This report documents the impact of three different types of oil left from the spill in water (tar mats) and on the shore (tar bars and buried oil) along the Gulf coast in various locations. These locations include: Grand Isle, Louisiana; Petit Bois Island, Mississippi; Bon Secour, Alabama; and Fort Pickens, Florida. In each of these locations, a net environmental benefit analysis evaluated the negative effects of beach cleanup on the resource itself and wildlife. The report also compared the impact on human health against Environmental Protection Agency data benchmarks. Generally, the results of the report indicate that cleanups were often more damaging than the remnant oil’s effect on the environment. Additional findings show that oil is unlikely to infiltrate groundwater. Although cleanups may have a negative impact, failure to adequately clean beaches results in its own threats, including: adult shorebirds consuming tarballs, and buried oil affecting sea turtle eggs and young survival.
http://www.restorethegulf.gov/ sites/default/files/u316/OSAT-2%20Report%20no%20ltr.pdf