Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Kirby Inland Marine, Inc., 296 F.3d 671 (8th Cir. 2002).

Jason Dare, J.D.

Even when a bridge is deemed an “unreasonable obstruction to navigation” pursuant to the Truman-Hobbs Act, the owner of that bridge is not presumed negligent when a vessel allides1 with it. Accordingly, when the M/V MISS DIXIE allided with the Clinton Railroad Bridge in Clinton, Iowa, the barge owner and operator had the burden of proving the bridge owner was negligent.

Oregon Rule vs. Pennsylvania Rule
Built in 1907, the Clinton Railroad Bridge (the “Clinton Bridge”) traverses the Mississippi River, and connects Clinton, Iowa with East Clinton, Illinois. On February 28, 1996, pursuant to the Truman-Hobbs Act2, the U.S. Coast Guard issued an Order to Alter the Bridge to the bridge owner, Union Pacific Railroad Company (“Union Pacific”). In its issuance, the Coast Guard cited that the Clinton Bridge was “unreasonably obstructing navigation” and ordered Union Pacific to alter it. Approximately two months later on May 5, 1996, the river barge towboat M/V MISS DIXIE, owned and operated by Kirby Inland Marine, Inc. (“Kirby”), allided with the Clinton Bridge and caused damage to both its cargo and the bridge.

Two judicially created rules could apply in this situation. Pursuant to the longstanding Oregon rule, when a vessel strikes a stationary object such as a bridge, a presumption is raised that the vessel’s crew was negligent.3 Conversely, the Pennsylvania Rule says that “where any party violates a statutory or regulatory rule designed to prevent collisions, that party has committed per se negligence and that party has the burden of proving that its statutory fault was not a contributing cause of the accident.”4 Union Pacific and Kirby reached a settlement agreement concerning the allision, but needed the court to answer whether the Oregon Rule or the Pennsylvania Rule applied. If the Oregon Rule applied, Kirby would be presumed negligent and would pay more under the settlement agreement. If the Pennsylvania Rule applied, Union Pacific would have the burden of proving it was not negligent, and Kirby would pay less under the settlement agreement. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa held that the Pennsylvania Rule was the proper rule to apply. Union Pacific appealed to the Eighth Circuit.

For the Pennsylvania Rule to apply, there must be “(1) proof by a preponderance of the evidence of violation of a statute or regulation that imposes a mandatory duty; (2) the statute or regulation must involve marine safety or navigation; and (3) the injury suffered must be of a nature that the statute or regulation was intended to prevent.”5 According to the Eighth Circuit, the Truman-Hobbs Act was not designed to promote safety, but was instead a funding act designed to identify bridges in need of federal assistance. Because no mandatory duty arose to repair a bridge deemed “unreasonably obstructive to navigation,” the first prong was not met. Secondly, prong two was not met because the Truman-Hobbs Act did not deal with marine safety or navigation. Finally, the Truman-Hobbs Act’s intent was to “decrease the cost of navigation by using federal funds to alter bridges which unreasonably obstruct navigation.”6 Even though altering a bridge may reduce allisions into that bridge, the court held this not to be the type of injury the Truman-Hobbs Act intended to prevent. Since none of the prongs required for the application of the Pennsylvania Rule were met, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling and applied the Oregon Rule instead.7

Burden of Proof
Kirby also asserted that because the Coast Guard deemed the Clinton Bridge an “unreasonable obstruction to navigation,” the Oregon Rule’s presumption of negligence is rebutted and the burden of proof is shifted to Union Pacific. In support of its proposition, Kirby cited a Seventh Circuit case which held that “if the Coast Guard may find the . . . bridge an unreasonable obstruction based on the cost and accident data, then so may the trier of fact in admiralty.”8 The Eighth Circuit, however, held that a vessel’s owner can attempt to rebut the Oregon Rule presumption with the fact the Coast Guard deemed the bridge an “unreasonable obstruction to navigation.” However, a Truman-Hobbs determination “is not conclusive evidence of negligence, but merely another piece of evidence which the trier of fact may consider in determining fault in a negligence action.”9

Conclusion
The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s ruling, holding that the Truman-Hobbs Act and the Pennsylvania Rule did not render the Oregon Rule’s presumption inapplicable.

ENDNOTES
1. The term “allision” refers to the collision of a ship with a fixed object.
2. 33 U.S.C. §§ 511-524 (2001).
3. The Oregon, 158 U.S. 186, 197 (1895).
4. Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Kirby Inland Marine, Inc., 296 F.3d 671, 674 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. 125, 136 (1873)).
5. Folkstone Mar. Ltd. v. CSX Corp., 64 F.3d 1037, 1047 (7th Cir. 1995).
6. Union Pacific, 296 F.3d at 675.
7. The court noted that it would not “invoke the Pennsylvania Rule to punish a bridge owner who controls a lawful bridge . . . [because] a bridge labeled an unreasonable obstruction is still a lawful bridge.” Id. at 676 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 511).
8. I&M Rail Link v. Northstar Navigation, Inc., 198 F.3d 1012, 1016 (7th Cir. 2000).
9. Union Pacific, 296 F.3d at 677.